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Dynamics of Resource Governance, Climate Change, and
Security: Insights from Nigeria and Norway
Abstract
This study examines the nexus between resource governance, climate change and security
in Nigeria and Norway against the backdrop of the resource curse. Based on the qualitative
analysis of secondary data, aided by the eco-violence theory, the study posits that the
prevalence of ecological conflict in resource curse countries thrives within the context of
resource mismanagement characterized by lack of optimal resource governance
frameworks. The study identifies corruption, poor resource utilization, rent seeking,
resource disenfranchisement and over dependence on oil revenues as critical drivers of
resource curse and eco-violence in Nigeria. With reference to the Norwegian governance
model, the study analyses the possibilities of effective resource governance for cushioning
the effects of existential climate threats and better resource management in Nigeria,
noting that dealing with climate security threats requires not only addressing the root
causes that perpetuate and incentivize them but adopting institutional mechanisms that
promote better resource governance.
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Introduction
Natural resources are vital for economic and industrial growth, yet
their abundance can impede or incentivize development. Studies in
macro-economic theory acknowledge the incapacitating effect of
resource wealth on economies with lack of effective governance
mechanisms and its impact on development outcomes.1 Many resourcerich countries expect the abundance and availability of natural resource
wealth to translate into meaningful development outcomes. However,
the incidences of corruption, dysfunctional institutions, and poor
resource management have plagued this expectation. This trend has
been associated with lack of effective and transparent natural resource
governance frameworks, which has engendered the paradox of resource
wealth.
The paradox posits that poor accountability in the management of
resource endowment engenders contradictions that trigger resource
curse and poverty. This article, premised on the eco-violence theory,
explores the resource curse paradox based on a comparative analysis
and insights from two countries–Nigeria and Norway–in the context of
its nexus with climate change and security. It also establishes
differences in the initiatives and policies on resource governance and
climate change in the two resource-rich countries, with the purpose of
drawing insights for ideal resource governance and climate security
implications.
The article adopts a mix of regulatory and comparative analyses and a
five-part structure. The first part introduces the study. The second part
presents an overview of key themes on resource governance, historical
contexts, and governance arrangements in the Nigerian and Norwegian
petroleum industries. Part 3 discusses the theoretical framework,
which the study adopts and teases out the eco-violence theory, human
security concept, and the paradox of resource curse as they relate to the
primary inquiry. Part 4 is a conceptual discussion on the nexus between
resource governance and climate security. It also undertakes a
comparative examination on resource governance and climate change
in Nigeria and Norway to show how different resource governance
regimes can influence both economic circumstances and climate
security in resource-rich countries. Part 5 presents concluding remarks
and policy insights.
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Contextualizing Resource Governance
The term resource governance is a tool for safeguarding resource
utilization and management.2 According to the Natural Resource
Governance Framework of the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature, it comprises the norms, institutions, and
processes that determine the exercise of power and responsibilities
over natural resources, as well as the decision-making and citizen
participation process in benefitting from resource management.3 For
resource governance to be effective, it requires democratic and
mutually supportive institutions that are equitable, accountable, and
transparent in the use of natural resources.4 Other key elements that
characterize the concept include legitimate use, equity, inclusiveness,
fairness, capability, adaptability, and functional and structural
integration.5 This also includes the promotion of public welfare and the
strengthening of civilian institutions.
The Resource Governance Index (RGI) of the Natural Resource
Governance Institute (NRGI) provides a metric for scoring and
evaluating the policies and practices that governments employ globally
in the management of their resource endowments particularly in oil,
gas, and mining. The RGI uses three key components–value realization,
revenue management, and enabling environment–to assess
approximately 89 countries that together produce 82 percent of the
world’s fossil fuels.6 Together, these components determine the level of
application of the key principles of resource governance in the
management of natural resources.
It is possible to include multiple countries that fit the focus-description
of this study. However, the article delimits its coverage to only two
countries, using two defined parameters–two resource-rich countries
in the Global South (Nigeria) and Global North (Norway). This
delimitation helps to capture geographical representation and provide
depth of analysis within a limited word count. Importantly, the study
acknowledges the profound differences between the two countries such
as population, colonial history, development progression, resource
ownership, governance system, and political stability that potentially
make any comparison between these countries lopsided and
problematic. However, these countries are reputable as prominent
petroleum producing jurisdictions in both the Global South and the
Global North. Thus, they represent good examples for the study. The
reliance on the petroleum sector as a major source of government
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revenue and national economic development in both countries further
justifies their comparison. In Norway, the oil and gas sector is
reputable as the country’s largest revenue spinner, measured in terms
of value added, government revenues, investments and export value,
and accounts for 36 percent of the country’s share of total exports and
18 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP).7 Likewise, Nigeria is
one of the largest exporters of crude oil in sub-Saharan Africa and the
petroleum sector accounts for 65 percent of governments’ revenue.8 It
is possible to undertake further analysis using a broader scope of
coverage. However, other countries with similar peculiarities may glean
useful insights from this study.

Nigerian Overview
The Petroleum Act 1969 has been the primary legal framework for the
governance of petroleum resources over the years. 9 The regime has
gone through a checkered history, but the Nigerian National Petroleum
Corporation (NNPC) currently exists as the country’s national oil
company (NOC) and instrument for both direct state participation and
petroleum resource management.10 Pursuant to its establishment
legislation, NNPC has powers relating to petroleum exploration,
production, refining, and transaction.
Due to poor performance of the country’s NOC and the need to create a
better investment framework for oil multinationals and prospective
investors, there has been a regulatory reform process with the
introduction of the Petroleum Industry Bill into the Nigerian
parliament in the year 2000. The bill was an ambitious legislative
project to overhaul the entire legal framework and amalgamate all the
laws relevant to the Nigerian petroleum industry. The complex and
voluminous nature of the bill occasioned long years of legislative
consideration and debates. Consequently, the Nigerian parliament
unbundled the bill into four different parts, namely:
•
•
•
•

Petroleum Industry Governance Bill;
Downstream Oil and Gas Administration Bill;
Petroleum Fiscal, and Petroleum Revenue Management Bill;
and
Petroleum Host Community Fund (PHCF) Bill.

The Nigerian parliament passed the Petroleum Industry Governance
Bill (PIGB) into law on May 25, 2017 after 17 years.11 At the time of
125
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writing, it awaited presidential assent. The other three bills meant to
take care of fiscal; administrative and community issues are yet to
complete the legislative cycle leading to the emergence of a
comprehensive new regulatory regime.
From a historical context, Nigeria’s colonial history has adversely
affected the development of the country’s petroleum industry,
particularly in terms of resource governance and ownership. This is
because colonialism engendered the subordination and domination of
Nigeria’s oil resources in the hands of multinational corporations
(MNCs) and transnational elites.12 This resulted in the inequitable
power relation in the production of oil and the pervasive
commoditization and appropriation of its benefits in post-colonial
Nigeria. As Cyril Obi argues, this is evident in the “deepened social
contradictions, unequal power relations and inequities in Nigeria’s oil
wealth at two levels: State-society and local-global.”13 At the statesociety level, these contradictions, spurred the rise of a petrobourgeoisie class heavily interested in the unbridled appropriation of
oil wealth accrued from the rents paid by MNCs.14 At the local-global
level, it consigned Nigeria to the supply of cheap oil at the global
market due to lack of infrastructure to refine its raw petroleum
resources. Thus, perpetuating the dependency theory, which explains
how the export of natural resources from poor and underdeveloped
periphery nations to the core wealthy states impoverishes the former
and enriches the latter.15
Furthermore, the economic and environmental impacts of resource
exploitation in Nigeria have received uncomplimentary remarks in the
literature. From an economic perspective, the country typifies an
example of a poverty-stricken region and state failure.16 From an
environmental perspective, incidences of greenhouse gas emissions,
pollution, environmental degradation, and oil spillage have
characterized oil and gas activities in the country.17 It is a common fact
that that venting and flaring of gas contribute significantly to
greenhouse gas emissions and consequential climate change, with
devastating environmental and health implications.18 Despite this
scientific fact, gas flaring has persisted in the country for decades. 19 On
environmental performance, the country has a poor record. As of 2018,
it ranked 100 out of 180 countries in global environmental performance
index, with a score of 54.76.20 These factors clearly show incidences of
the resource curse theory, and inspire calls for a paradigm shift in the
resource governance framework of the country.21
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Norwegian Overview
The Norwegian model for petroleum resource governance is an
administrative design that separates commercial, policy, and regulatory
functions in hydrocarbons management.22 Accordingly, the Norwegian
Petroleum Directorate exercises regulatory functions; Norway’s
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy is responsible for policymaking;
while commercial functions lie within the purview of Equinor (formerly
Statoil), the Norwegian independent NOC. This model has helped
Norway to manage its resources effectively and pitched its NOC high as
an international oil company carrying out hydrocarbon operations
beyond the confines of Norway. There is a strong argument on the
possibility of exporting the Norwegian model as best practice for
petroleum resource governance to other resource-rich jurisdictions.23
The major attractive features of the Norwegian model are transparency,
a sovereign wealth fund (SWF), establishment of a vibrant national oil
company and institutions, and clear division of tasks between
respective institutions.24 These entrench democracy, technical
expertise, and effectiveness in resource administration in Norway.
It is also important to highlight the economic implication of resource
governance in Norway and the country’s environmental performance as
a resource-rich country. On economic effect, its resource governance
model has helped the country to avoid incidences of resource curse and
for economic development.25 Norway presently has the world’s highest
SWF, with managed assets of over one trillion USD.26 On
environmental performance, the country has been able to reduce
environmental issues associated with petroleum activities over the
years. As of 2018, it ranked 14 out of 180 countries in global
environmental performance index, with a score of 77.49.27

Theoretical Exploration
Eco-violence
This article adopts the eco-violence theory as an analytical framework
to explain the nexus between resource wealth, climate change, and
security. From an epistemological viewpoint, the theory is rooted in
contemporary scholarship on eco-survivalism, conflict studies, and
ethnography. The key idea of the eco-violence theory is that
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environmental pressure arising from the extraction of natural resources
engenders conflicts.28
Proponents of eco-violence theory argue that the scarcity–and not the
abundance of natural resources–drives and sustains environmental
conflict. They posit that this phenomenon manifests in two ways. First,
scarce resources compel powerful groups to brazenly capture and seek
to appropriate and redistribute natural resource wealth to their cronies
or their interests. This situation causes the marginalization of the
powerless, the disenfranchisement of many from the collective resource
wealth such as seen in Zapatista uprising between the indigenous
people and the subsistence farmers in Chiapas, Mexico and in
Venezuela where local crime syndicates combined with Colombian
guerrilla groups are fostering conflicts due to gold deposits in south
Venezuela.
Second, it construes eco-survivalism as a manifestation of resource
depletion and a precursor for environmental-induced violence. In
addition, it perceives the overdependence on primary commodity
exports as an indicator of economic vulnerability and a catalyst for
unbridled resource competition. The arising struggle due to the
displacement, disenfranchisement, and dislocation of individuals from
resource benefits, results in environmental conflicts. This pre-empts a
violent security situation emerging from ecological conflicts. This is
akin to what Indra Sosya termed the shrinking resource pie to explain
how scarcities serve as catalyst for conflicts.29 The case of blood
diamonds in Sierra Leone, the activities of the Niger Delta militants in
southern Nigeria and the conflict timber civilian crisis in Cambodia,
Democratic Republic of Congo, and Liberia are classic examples that
buttress the eco-violence theory.
Yet, there is an opposing view that affirms, the abundance honey pot of
natural resources–and not their scarcity–is the precursor for
environmental conflict.30 Contrary to eco-violence theorists, some
scholars in development studies and macroeconomics think that higher
levels of conflict and lower levels of human and institutional
development emerge because of the struggle for abundant natural
resources and not its scarcity.31 They posit that the natural capital
wealth accruing from the appropriation of resources incentivizes lootseeking and environmental pressures for resources. There however
remains a paradox of resource wealth and a human security dimension.
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The next subsections that follow will present an overview of these
concepts as they relate to the present inquiry.
Human Security
The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 66/920 defines
human security as “people-centered, comprehensive, context-specific,
and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and
empowerment of all people.”32 The Human Development Report
published by United Nations Development Programme, underscores
human security as comprising seven core elements: Economic, food,
health, environmental, personal, community and political security. This
means human security is a composite of the political, social, economic,
cultural, environmental system that gives people the building blocks of
survival, livelihood, and dignity’.33 Therefore, exclusion of individuals
and communities from these core elements is essentially a threat to
their human security.
Likewise, parsing resource curse as an issue of human security is the
recognition that the disenfranchisement of people from resource wealth
engenders impacts that threaten their livelihood and survival. This is
analogous to Mary Kaldor’s conceptualization of human security at
three levels. The first refers to the everyday security of individuals and
communities. The second refers to the enabling factors that threaten
human freedom and cause fear, and the third is the interrelatedness of
security in different places.34

Paradox of Resource Curse
The idea that resource wealth translates into economic growth is often
grossly erroneous. As evidence shows, several resource rich countries
are worse off than their resource-poor counterparts are.35 Countries
like Japan, South Korea, and Singapore have demonstrated that
resource wealth is not a prerequisite for economic growth. The concept
of resource curse or the paradox of plenty, as coined by Richard Auty,
explains that countries with abundant resources often develop slowly,
more corruptly, more violently, and with more authoritarian
governments than others without resource abundance.36 The core idea
in the resource curse theory is that natural resources can be either a
blessing or a curse, depending on its judicious use for national
development. Several theoretical models explain the resource curse
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hypothesis: Dutch disease model, rent-seeking model, and the
institutions model.
The Dutch disease model posits that the co-existence of a thriving
sector and lagging sub-sector of traded goods engenders a negative
correlation between resource wealth and economic growth.37 The
resulting impact is a monocultural economy that depends heavily on
natural resources export. This also under develops other sectors of the
economy. The rent-seeking model explains the syndrome in resourcerich countries to rely heavily on rents and remittances paid by external
clients as the main source of national revenue.38 This results in a
rentier predatory state that perpetuates an underdevelopment that
subjects the country’s economic structure to external windfalls and
wealth shocks that emanates from global fluctuations in demand and
supply. The institutions model sees the reason for the lag and poor
economic performance in resource-rich countries because of inferior
institutional arrangements.39 This stems from the notion that
institutions serve as key mechanism for moderating resource
governance and driving developmental initiatives.

Discussion: Conceptual and Practical Relationships
In interrogating the nexus between resource governance and climate
security, a critical consideration is to determine whether countries
experiencing the resource curse are more likely to experience higher
levels of eco-violence than their counterparts with better resource
management are. Piecing this puzzle together requires understanding
the realities in these countries and the disproportionate share of
resource wealth, which engenders outcomes that trigger conflicts,
environmental violence, and local contestations for the share of oil
resources. Poor economic performance, rise in poverty levels, and low
infrastructural development are some of the main features of countries
that rely preponderantly on resource rents. The presence of the natural
resource is however not the curse itself, but the poor governance
structures for their management and equitable distribution of the
benefits accruing from them.
Climate change, Climate security, and Eco-Violence
The existential threat of climate change portends catastrophic
consequences for the environment, with attendant security
implications. The rise in sea level, desertification, poor agricultural
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yield, increased migration, drought, and reduced economic activities
could drive scarcity and undue competition for natural resources that
potentially create conflict and instability. This links to climate security.
Climate security is the idea that climate change related threats
amplifies existing risks in the society that imperils human security, the
environment, economy, and global infrastructure.40 Climate security
risks emanate from the potential food crisis due to shortages and
scarcities, health emergencies and environmental catastrophes that are
likely to occur when climate change threats exacerbate. As the
foregoing analysis suggests, resource rich countries with poor
governance arrangements are unlikely to weather the shocks compared
to countries with good resource governance mechanisms.
Contextualizing eco-violence within the ambit of climate security
presupposes that the scarcity or the abundance of natural resources
could drive conflicts in the absence of an intervening variable to
forestall its impacts. Situating this within the purview of the ecoviolence theory implies that the exacerbation of climate change effects,
together with the depletion of natural resources, incentivizes conflict
and violence. The potential triggers of violence in this regard include
poor resource governance, undue resource appropriation, corruption,
inequity, and lack of transparency in the utilization of resource wealth.
The ongoing herder-farmer conflict in Nigeria highlights this. The loss
of arable land in northern Nigeria because of climate change has caused
ongoing violent confrontations between farmers and nomads. This has
resulted in significant human death toll and the militarization of
nomadic pastoralism.41
Likewise, in the Niger Delta, the alienated indigenous people
continually threaten the Nigerian government for their share of
resource rents. These disenfranchisement conflicts–violent
confrontations arising from alienation from resource rents–create
adverse outcomes such as instability, vandalization of oil infrastructure
and arable lands which further deepen the resource curse. The inherent
dilemma for climate security is that the abundance of these resources
potentially creates human security crisis, which would most likely occur
in resource scarcity if poverty and underdevelopment were pervasive.
This implies that, as climate change threat worsens, countries with
natural resource endowment have higher propensity to encounter crisis
when competition for abundant resources increases.
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In countries with poor resource governance, these changes could
increase vulnerabilities and lower resilience to climate adaptation
compared to countries with effective resource governance mechanisms.
Additionally, environmental institutions working in fragile states face
an increased risk of human security conflicts in the absence of a proper
management of interventions for environmental problems in those
countries. In this case, a move towards renewable energy sources to
reduce fossil fuel emissions such as increased biofuels, land grabs of
communal lands for energy decentralization initiatives could spark up
conflict and local resistance due to lack of transparent and effective
governance structures. This resistance could be in form of insecurities,
speculations, and suspicion as to unfair exploitation of resources,
corruption, or a misunderstanding of the intended benefits the project
could have on the community.
In Nigeria, this situation is already apparent in the Niger Delta, where
the exclusion and the marginalization of the local communities from
the wealth and benefits from the resources extracted from their lands
and waters have caused the rise of militancy and proliferation of small
arms and light weapons. The situation is similar in Kazakhstan,
Mexico, and Iraq where the exclusion of the people from the benefits of
resource wealth fosters disenfranchisement conflicts. In Sierra Leone,
for example, issues relating to diamond extraction have led to one of
the most violent armed conflicts in communities that claimed many
lives. One key question asked by Sierra Leone citizens relates to the
utilization, management, and translation of the benefits of their
resource wealth for their development.42 The other relates to the
economic exclusion from enjoying the benefits derived from the
country’s mining industry due to corruption and poor management.
The situation underlies the impact of weak resource governance.
Resource Governance in Nigeria and Norway: Comparative
Assessment
The case of Nigeria and Norway–which are two countries with
enormous petroleum resource wealth–buttresses the resource curse
and, secondly, escaping eco-violence threats. While Norway has been
able to avoid both the resource curse and eco-violence threats by
turning the resource wealth into blessing, Nigeria, on the other hand,
has suffered from these twin problems.43 The Norwegian GDP per
capita is one of the highest in the world and thirty five times higher
than that of Nigeria.44 A comparative assessment of both countries’
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economic performance reveals fundamental disparities. In terms of
Human Development Index (HDI), Norway ranks first globally, while
Nigeria ranks 157.45 Natural resources from petroleum hydrocarbons
constitute the main stay of both countries’ economy. In terms of
institutional settings in the oil sector, both countries have national
companies representing state interests in oil and gas activities–Equinor
for Norway and NNPC for Nigeria. Both countries also generate
significant oil revenues.
Although there are fundamental historical differences in the political
and socio-economic realities of these countries, they share a common
ground in their production capacity and the role of natural resources in
driving their economy. As afore stated, the colonial past and the postcolonial character of the Nigerian state have preserved the peripheral
structure of the country’s petroleum resources and the distribution of
its oil wealth. As Cyril Obi posits, “Nigeria’s resource curse is a
manifestation of the class relations, contradictions and conflicts rooted
in the subordination of its oil wealth and resources to transnational
processes and elites embedded in globalized capitalist relations.”46
Whereas the Norwegian economy has benefitted from its Continental
Shelf’s oil wealth to earn the top place in the Human Development
Index 2019 rankings (0.954), top one percent in World Development
Indicators; and a high-income and a high-developed country both in
GDP and economy.47
In addition, both countries have a well-established SWF, but not in
equal measure. As of 2018, Nigeria’s SWF ranked 62 while the
Norwegian variant ranked first. As the article earlier noted, Norway
currently has the highest SWF globally. Norway, through the
management of its SWF, has demonstrated its ability to ensure
responsible and long-term management of its oil and gas revenues for
the benefit of its current and future generations.48 The SWF, which is
the accumulated savings of a financial instrument owned by the state or
the foreign exchange reserve earnings by a state for specific purposes
without explicit liabilities, has, since its investment, become one of the
world’s largest funds.49 The Norges Bank Investment Management
estimates the current value of this fund to be approximately 10,000
billion Kroner ($1.09 trillion), spreading across 70 percent in global
equities and the rest in real estate and fixed asset.50
In contrast, Nigeria has a different experience with managing the
benefits accruing from its petroleum oil endowments. Its post-colonial
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antecedents have played a huge part in the allocation and appropriation
of its resource wealth. Richard Joseph attributes this to the prebendal
politics prevalent in the Nigerian polity, where elected officials share
government revenues and use them to benefit their cronies or ethnic
groups.51 Nigeria currently has an HDI ranking index of 0.534 (which is
158 out of 189 countries) and classified as a low-income and a
developing economy by the World Bank despite producing more than
10 million gallons of crude oil per year and a huge natural gas reserve.
Nigeria’s high dependency on crude oil ostensibly shows through its
presently predominantly mono-cultural economy despite the
abundance of other natural and mineral resources such as coal,
uranium and copper; thereby increasing the country’s vulnerability to
international crude price volatility.52
The pervasive manifestation of the resource curse accounts for the high
levels of institutional corruption, poor management of resources, and
weak resource governance mechanisms.53 This explains why oil-rich
nations experience poor development outcomes compared to their
counterparts. Poor resource governance is also a critical factor that has
blighted development outcomes. The same period in 2019 when
Norway’s SWF grew to the trillion-dollar mark, Nigeria made
deductions from its Excess Crude Oil accounts to the tune of $325
million. However, the economic benefits of this wealth are not
translating to meaningful economic growth, despite Nigeria having an
SWF of 1.6 billion dollars. Approximately 41 percent of Nigerians
(about 83 million of Nigeria’s over 200 million population) live in
poverty or less than 1 dollar a day.54 Accordingly, several factors explain
Nigeria’s resource curse. These include dependence on oil rents from
MNCs, poor resource governance arrangements, prebendal allocation
and appropriation of resource wealth, primitive accumulation of
natural resources, pervasive commoditization and subordination of oil
production by transnational and political elites, export dependency,
post-colonial character of the Nigerian state and institutional
corruption in the petroleum sector.
Many factors account for Norway’s success in its resource governance
and management. As Section 1 above suggests, Norway’s petroleum
sector management highlights sound regulatory framework,
institutional quality, and governance as key principles influencing
policy implementation and allocation of economic value from its
natural resources. These principles also account for Norway’s market
competitiveness and resilience, investor confidence, national
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development, and inflow of foreign direct investments.55 Another
critical factor is the application of the Nordic model in the governance
of their oil resources. The model consists of three prongs: A dynamic
process of creative destruction and innovation, bridging wage
differentials and high spending on public welfare.56 Arguably, this has
accounted for high quality institutions focused on stabilizing oil-related
political and social issues and facilitating wealth distribution.57 In
addition, Norway adopts a democratic framework for its oil industry
that unites relevant petroleum actors under a broad co-operation
program and encourages organizational development together with
embedding industrial influence and technical development across
board.
Norway is also implementing the Paris Agreement, United Nations
Sustainable Development Goals and aims to reduce its emissions by 40
percent by 2030 in line with the European Union (EU) climate
commitments.58 Although its membership of the EU influences its
regulatory framework, its country-level resource governance trajectory
shows a serious commitment to environmental, economic, and
sustainable development outcomes. While there are other countries
such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, converting their oil
wealth into meaningful economic outcomes, Norway is a classic case of
how the effective management of resources can prevent
disenfranchised conflicts while also ensuring the utilization of the
resource endowment for collective good.
Countries like Nigeria can take a cue from Norway to incorporate a
good framework that ensures optimal resource management and
prevent eco-violence. Options may include the application of a Nordic
model to the Nigeria’s resource governance regime. This is a common
theme in the literature. This does not necessarily attach a status of
miracle to the Norwegian model. Its implementation is not an
incontrovertible and impeccable guarantee for optimal resource
management. However, a similar model may foster an oil industry that
seeks the public good beyond the exclusive interests of a selective few.
This way, resource rent benefits are distributed and utilized for societal
development and improving human capacity. There is also the prospect
to diversify the economy away from oil to focus on the development of
other sectors to prevent the pervasive manifestation of the Dutch
Disease. Furthermore, managing the triggers and drivers of
environmental violence and conflicts can come by way of better
resource exploitation and utilization. This would require the
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involvement of stakeholders in various local communities within and
around the oil site in the decision-making process over the resources on
their lands and increasing sensitization on climate adaptation
strategies.
These are lessons for countries experiencing the resource curse, which
serve useful policy purposes for averting the catastrophic effects of
climate change. It follows that the optimal management of resources
and resource rents could incentivize development and help
communities to better adapt to climate change threats. There is also the
positive outcome of de-escalating tensions that trigger eco-violence.

Concluding Remarks and Policy Insights
This article set out to analyze the nexus between resource governance,
climate change, and security in Nigeria and Norway. The analysis,
based on the theories of resource curse and eco-violence, establishes
that poor resource governance exacerbates climate security concerns. It
demonstrates that the prevalence of the resource curse in countries
incentivizes eco-violence and induces disenfranchisement conflicts.
Additionally, it shows that an effective resource governance regime
engenders better resource wealth distribution and development
outcomes.
There are options for countries that suffer the resource curse to undo
their current situation. First, there is a need for more action towards
promoting the institutionalization of effective resource governance
regime in the petroleum and natural resources industry as a panacea
and strategy towards climate change response and de-escalation of
communal and local tensions. Second, diversification of the economy
would also open avenues that reduce dependence on resource rents and
engender a more equitable national development of other sectors. This
addresses issues regarding sustainable development, which ensures the
extractive industries consider the needs of their immediate
environment, citizens, and future generations. Third, there is a
likelihood that climate change would cause a new ecological threat that
affects oil demand, and consequently affect the exports and GDP of
countries blighted by the resource curse. Increasing the size of the
investment of the SWFs, as in the case of Norway, may help cushion the
effects in the rainy day.
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As the dwindling of oil price in recent times has shown, especially
amidst the recent coronavirus pandemic, resource endowment offers
no bail out option for resource-rich countries and their citizens if they
have not effectively managed their resources over the years. It is
however interesting to mention that resource rich countries with good
resource governance mechanisms have equally been affected by the
crash in oil prices due to the fall in global demand. Arguably, the effects
in these countries compared to those with poor resource governance
arrangements differ. Embracing a more adaptable Nordic Model,
despite its imperfections, in the Nigerian context could potentially
drive a better regulatory framework for the management and utilization
of resource wealth for public good. It could also reduce the chances of
eco-violence and climate security.
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